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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES RAISED BY APPELLANT 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court correctly ruled that the notice of interest recorded by Allan 
G. Birch constituted a wrongful lien and whether the filing of a Petition to Nullify a 
Wrongful Lien, signed by counsel for the record interest holder, and supported by 
the sworn affidavit of the record interest holder complies with the requirements of 
Utah Code Ann. §38-9-7? 
Standard of Review: Questions of law are reviewed for correctness. John Wagner 
Assocs. v. Hercules, Inc., 191 P.2d 1123, 1126 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
2. Whether the district court abused its discretion in excluding the legal conclusions as 
to the ultimate question of two lay witnesses and concluding, based on the testimony 
of a qualified physician and the testimony of the alleged incapacitated, that such 
person was not incapacitated?. 
Standard of Review: Whether a lay witness can state an opinion rests almost altogether 
in the judicial discretion of the trial judge. In re Kesler, 702 P.2d 86, 94 (Utah 1985) 
(quoting In re Hanson's Estate, 52 P.2d 1103, 1115-16 (Utah 1935). The district court's 
factual findings, regarding whether Bernard J. Myers was an incapacitated person, is 
reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Buzas Baseball, Inc. v. Salt Lake 
Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 941, 948 (Utah 1996). 
1 
3. Whether the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to approve a petition for 
formal probate and formal appointment of personal representative when an estate 
has assets at the time of the decedent's death, but ^ portion of such assets are 
distributed and it is disputed as to whether the estate has assets at the time of 
approval of the Petition for Formal Probate and Formal Appointment of Personal 
Representative? 
Standard of Review: The determination of whether a court has subject matter 
jurisdiction is a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness. Beaver County v. 
Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT 81,1J 8, 31 P.3d 1147. 
4. Whether the district court had authority to modify a stipulated order when the 
express language of the order, which was agreed to as o^ form by all parties, allowed 
for such modification? 
Standard of Review: Interpretation of an order of the district court is a question of law, 
which is reviewed for correctness. Canyon Meadows Hdme Owners Ass'n v. Wasatch 
County, 2001 UT App 414, f 7, 40 P.3d 1148. The District Court possesses inherent 
authority to modify its own order. 
2 
5. Does a vague reference to an issue, without further evidentiary support or the 
support of relevant legal authority preserve such issue for appeal? 
Standard of Review: Questions of law are reviewed for correctness. John Wagner 
Assocs. v. Hercules, Inc., 797 P.2d 1123, 1126 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
6. Whether the district court correctly dismissed Birch Brothers' complaint, when 
every issue raised in the complaint was either moot or was fully adjudicated during 
the course of the bench trial? 
Standard of Review: Questions of law are reviewed for correctness. John Wagner 
Assocs. v. Hercules, Inc., 797 P.2d 1123, 1126 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
7. Whether the Birch Brothers9 appeal is frivolous under rule 33 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure? 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES RAISED BY CROSS APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
8. Did the district court's reduction of attorney fees, after previously awarding the full 
amount of attorney fees, without providing any basis for the reduction constitute a 
clear abuse of discretion? 
Standard of Review: "Calculation of reasonable attorney fees is in the sound discretion 
of the trial court, and will not be overturned in the absence of a showing of a clear abuse 
of discretion." Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988) (citation 
omitted). 
3 
Issue Preserved: Issue was preserved by Affidavit of Attorney Fee (R. at 348-354.) and 
Petition for Wrongful Lien (R. at 140). 
9. Did the trial court err in rescinding the award of statutory damages in the amount of 
$1000.00, which award is mandatory under Utah Code Ann. §38-9-4? 
Standard of Review: Statutory interpretation is reviewed for correctness. See Eastern 
Utah Broad v. Labor Comm% 2007 UT App 99, f 5, 158 P.3d 1115. 
Issue Preserved: Issue was preserved by Affidavit of Attorney Fee (R. at 348-354.) and 
Petition for Wrongful Lien (R. at 140). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-4. Civil liability for filing wrongful lien—Damages. 
Utah Code Ann. §75-1-201(22). Utah Uniform Probate Code Definition of 
"Incapacitated Person." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellee and Cross-Appellant Bernard J. Myers ("Bernard") objects to Appellants 
Allan G. Birch, Glenn L. Birch and James Birch (collectively the "Birch Brothers") 
Statement of the Case, (Br. of Birch Brothers at 3-8), because it contains misleading and 
argumentative assertions that unfairly distort the record below and states facts that were 
not established below. 
This case involves disputes related to the administration of the estate of Eva L. 
Myers and the administration of the Bernard J. Myers and Eva L. Myers Revocable 
Living Trust, dated November 29, 2005 (the "Trust"). The Trust was established for the 
4 
purpose of providing for the financial needs of Eva L. Myers ("Eva") and Bernard J. 
Myers ("Bernard") during their joint lifetimes and upon the death of the first to die, Eva 
in this case, to provide for the needs of the survivor, Bernard. The Trust was funded by a 
deed of the Blackhawk Property to the Trust, opening of joint Trust bank accounts and a 
general assignment of all the property of Eva and Bernard. In the event there are any 
assets left in the Trust after the death of the second to die, the remaining Trust assets are 
to be distributed to the Birch Brothers and Gary Myers, Bernard's son, in accordance 
with the terms of the Trust. 
The primary source of contention in this case relates to a particular Trust asset, the 
property located at 3598 Blackhawk Drive, West Valley City, Utah (the "Blackhawk 
Property"), which was Eva's home, before her marriage to Bernard, and became the 
marital home of Eva L. Myers and Bernard J. Myers before Eva's death. Upon 
establishing the Trust, Eva conveyed the Blackhawk Property to the Trust. After Eva's 
death, Bernard, as trustee of the Trust, no longer desired to live in the Blackhawk 
Property, therefore he listed it for sale and purchased a smaller home to live in. The 
Birch Brothers, Eva's children from a prior marriage, did not want the Blackhawk 
Property to be sold. The Birch Brothers desire an early distribution of what they perceive 
to be their future inheritance and want to prevent Trust assets from being expended for 
Bernard's reasonable needs in accordance with the terms of the Trust. 
In order to prevent the Blackhawk Property from being sold, the Birch Brothers 
claimed that Bernard, as trustee of the Trust, did not possess the authority to sell the 
Blackhawk Property. Upon discovering that Bernard had listed the Blackhawk Property 
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for sale, one of the Birch Brothers, Allan G. Birch, filed a notice of interest against the 
Blackhawk Property in order to prevent the sale of the Blackhawk Property. Bernard 
responded by filing a petition to nullify the notice of interest as a wrongful lien. The 
Birch Brothers also filed a complaint seeking to prevent Bernard from selling the 
Blackhawk Property by claiming he was mentally incapacitated and not able to serve as 
trustee of the Trust. The Birch Brothers' action was subsequently consolidated with 
Bernard's probate action. 
A hearing was held on the wrongful lien and the district court determined that the 
notice of interest was a wrongful lien and awarded Bernard the full amount of attorney 
fees requested and statutory damages. In April of 2008, the district court, sua sponte and 
without providing any facts or analysis for doing so, reduced the amount of attorney fees 
previously awarded to Bernard and denied Bernard an award of statutory damages. This 
reduction in the award of attorney fees and the denial of statutory damages forms the sole 
basis of Bernard's cross-appeal. Allan G. Birch now claims on appeal that the district 
court erred in determining that the notice of interest was a wrongful lien and the Birch 
Brothers claim that the district court erred in dismissing their complaint. 
The district court ordered the parties to mediation. The mediation was 
unsuccessful. As the remaining issues in this case, Bernard's incapacity and Bernard's 
authority under the Trust to sell the Blackhawk Property, neared trial, the parties agreed 
at a scheduling conference and motion hearing that the Blackhawk Property could be 
sold. Therefore, the sole issue remaining for trial was whether or not Bernard was 
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incapacitated and not able to serve as personal representative of Eva's estate and trustee 
of the Trust. 
After a two day bench trial, which included extensive testimony from Bernard and 
testimony from his long-time physician, Dr. Margaret Lunt, the district court determined 
that the Birch Brothers failed to meet their burden in establishing that Bernard was an 
incapacitated person, appointed Bernard personal representative of Eva's estate and 
dismissed the Eiirch Brother's complaint, which decision, as well as the district court's 
decision related to the wrongful lien, led to this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Bernard was married to Eva L. Myers ("Eva"). (R. at 17.) On November 29, 
2005 Bernard and Eva created the Bernard J. Myers and Eva L. Myers Revocable Living 
Trust (the "Trust"). (R. at 63-84.) The Trust was funded by a deed of the Blackhawk 
Property to Trust, the opening of Trust Accounts and a general assignment of all the 
property of Eva and Bernard to the Trust. (R. at 86.) At the same time, Eva executed a 
pour-over will (the "Will"), which devised all of Eva's property, not already in the Trust, 
to the Trust. (R. at 92-96.) Also on November 29, 2005 Eva conveyed, by warranty 
deed, that certain real property located at 3598 Blackhawk Drive, West Valley Utah (the 
"Blackhawk Property") to the Trust. (R. at 177.) On May 29, 2007 Eva died. (R. at 
179.) 
On July 27, 2007 Bernard filed his Petition for Formal Probate of will and Formal 
Appointment of Personal Representative (the "Petition for Formal Probate and 
Appointment"). (R. at 1-12.) Bernard, through the filing of the Petition for Formal 
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Probate and Appointment, sought to be formally appointed personal representative of the 
estate of Eva L. Myers ("Eva"), his deceased wife, and sought the formal probate of the 
Will Id. On August 15, 2007 the Birch Brothers filed their Objection to Petition for 
Formal Probate of Will and Formal Appointment of Personal Representative (the 
"Objection to Petition for Formal Probate and Appointment"). (R. at 16-19.) The 
Objection to Petition for Formal Probate and Appointment opposed the appointment of 
Bernard as personal representative by claiming that Bernard suffered from dementia and 
would not be able to comprehend the procedures in law relative to the office of personal 
representative. (R. at 16.) 
In August of 2007 Bernard listed the Blackhawk Property for sale with Coldwell 
Banker. (R. at 717, 17I23-24.)1 In an attempt to prevent Bernard from selling the 
Blackhawk Property, on August 15, 2007 Allan G. Birch filed a Notice of Interest in Real 
Property (the "Notice of Interest") claiming an interest in the property as an heir and 
named personal representative of Eva's estate. (R. at 205.) Bernard, not Allan G. Birch, 
is the named personal representative under the Will. (R. at 93.) 
On August 29, 2007, Bernard, as trustee of the Trustb by and through counsel, sent 
a Request to Release the Notice of Interest (the "Request to Release"). (R. at 207-208.) 
On September 26, 2007, more than 10 days after the Request to Release was sent, 
Bernard, filed his Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien (the "Petition to Nullify") and in 
The Record cite for transcripts contains a single number for the entire transcript, therefore the 
record is cited by number followed by the specific page number and line number. For example 
the entire January 30, 2008 is cited as record number 718 therefore the cite (R. at 718, 6:11-
17) refers to page 6 lines 11-17 of Record 718. 
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accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, served the Petition to Nullify upon 
Edward Garrett, counsel of record for Allan G. Birch. (R. at 131-141,) The Petition to 
Nullify was supported by the sworn affidavit of Bernard, as trustee of the Trust, the 
record interest holder. (R. at 124-130.) The Petition to Nullify came before the district 
court for hearing on October 15, 2007 (the "Wrongful Lien Hearing"). (R. at 317.) 
The sole argument raised in the district court by Allan G. Birch was that the 
Notice of Interest was not a wrongful lien because Allan G. Birch had a vested interest in 
the Blackhawk Property. (R. at 251-257, R. at 717, 11:11-15.) At the conclusion of the 
Wrongful Lien Hearing, the district court took the matter under advisement. (R. at 317.) 
On October 25, 2007 the district court issued a minute entry order as follows, "now being 
fully advised orders the petition to nullify wrongful lien is granted." (R. at 338.) 
Over a month later, on December 3, 2007, the district court entered its Findings of 
Fact Conclusions of Law and Order Granting Bernard J. Myers5 Petition to Nullify 
Wrongful Lien (the "First Lien Order") awarding statutory damages in the amount of 
$1,000.00 and attorneys fees in the amount.of $11,738.00. (R. at 391-394.) The First 
Lien Order found, in pertinent part, that: (1) Allan G. Birch has a future interest in the 
Trust, which is subject to total divestment and does not hold a vested interest in the 
Blackhawk Property (R. at 393); and (2) Allan G. Birch does not have the right to 
possess, use, or convey the Blackhawk Property; therefore, Allan G. Birch is not an 
owner of the Blackhawk property. Id. 
Almost six months after the Wrongful Lien Hearing, on April 7, 2008, the district 
court entered its second Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order Granting 
9 
Bernard J. Myers' Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien reducing the award of attorneys fees 
to $7,700.00 and rescinding the award of statutory damages, which award was previously 
entered pursuant to the First Lien Order. (R. at 676-679.) 
Two weeks after the minute order held that the notice of interest constituted a 
wrongful lien, on November 15, 2007, Allan G. Birch filed a Motion for Reconsideration 
of the Minute Order Nullifying the Wrongful Lien (the "Motion to Reconsider"). (R. at 
365-371.) Despite being notified, on multiple occasions, that a notice to submit had 
never been filed with respect to the Motion to Reconsider, Allan G. Birch never filed a 
notice to submit the Motion to Reconsider. (R. at 480.) 
Allan G. Birch now claims, for the first time in this appeal, other than through the 
Motion to Reconsider that was never submitted for decision, that: (1) Bernard did not 
sign the petition and did not verify the same by Affidavit (Br. of Appellant at 9); (2) the 
Petition to Nullify was never served on Allan G. Birch (Br. of Appellant at 10); and (3) 
that Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1 et seq. does not apply to the Notice of Interest (Br. of 
Appellant at 10.) 
Two months after Bernard filed his Petition for Fornjial Probate and Appointment, 
on September 27, 2007, the Birch Brothers filed a complaint naming Bernard and John 
Does 1-4 as defendants and captioned as case number 070913976 (the "Birch 
Complaint"). (R. of case 070913976 at 1-5.) The complaint asserted the following three 
causes of action: (1) that Bernard was incapacitated and not competent and therefore 
should be removed as trustee of the Trust; (2) that Bernard, as trustee of the Trust, did not 
10 
possess the authority to sell the Blackhawk Property; and (3) conversion of the 
Blackhawk Property. (R. of case 070913976 at 3-4.) 
A month after the filing of the Birch Complaint, on November 7, 2007, Bernard 
filed a motion to consolidate case numbers 073901141 and 070912976. On January 4, 
2008 the district court granted Bernard's motion to consolidate, thereby consolidating 
case number 073901141 and 070913976. 
On September 20, 2007, Bernard filed Petitioner's Motion for Hearing on 
Competency and Petition for Interpretation of the Myers Estate Planning Documents (the 
"Petition of Interpretation") requesting that the district court determine that the Trust 
grants Bernard, as trustee of the Trust, the authority to sell the Blackhawk Property. 
(R. at 41-42.) The Petition for Interpretation came before the district court for oral 
argument on January 30, 2008 (the "Hearing on Interpretation of the Trust). (R. at 494.) 
At Hearing on the Interpretation of the Trust, the district court asked the parties 
whether an agreement could be reached with respect to what to do with the Blackhawk 
Property. (R. at 718, 6:17-22.) The parties then agreed as follows: 
The Court: Are you in agreement that the house should be 
sold and the proceeds kept— 
Mr, Alderman (counselfor Bernard): Yes. 
The Court: -and maintained in the future? 
Mr. Garrett (counsel for the Birch Brothers): Yes. 
(R. at 718, 9:18-22.) 
With respect to the proceeds upon a sale of the Blackhawk Property, the parties 
agreed as follows* 
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The Court ...Then let's go ahead and I assume you're in 
agreement we can order it [the sales proceeds] be placed in an 
account that can't be withdrawn without consent of both 
parties and they'd have to each sign. 
Mr. Alderman: That'd be fine, Your Honor. 
The Court: Or court order. Okay? 
Mr. Garrett: That's the underlying point there, Your Honor, 
that before any of it could be withdrawn, it must be shown 
that there is a need on the part of the petitioneil. 
The Court: Well, I would assume that Vou're both in 
agreement that the money ought to be withdrawn that that 
condition would be met. I would also make the assumption 
that if you don't agree to have it withdrawn and you can 
know you can come to the Court for the court orders, we'll 
cross that bridge on that day for whatever the need may or 
may not be and then I can make the ultimate determination as 
to whether or not the funds should be withdrawn. 
Mr. Garrett: That's fine. 
(R. at 718, 11:18-25 through 12:1-11.) 
Pursuant to the above described agreement, on Match 3, 2008 the district court 
entered the Order for Sale of Home, Denying Motion to Dismiss and Denying 
Petitioner's Motion to Interpret Trust (the "Order for Sal$"), the terms of which were 
agreed to as to form by counsel for Allan G. Birch. (R. at 493-495.) Pursuant to the 
Order for Sale, the district court ordered that the Blackhawk Property be sold and "the 
proceeds of the sale described in paragraph 4 [of the Order for Sale] shall be placed in an 
interest bearing account in the joint names of Gary layers and Allan Birch and 
distributions from such account be made only pursuant to a joint stipulation of the parties 
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or further order of the Court for the benefit of Bernard Myers. (R. at 494-495) 
(emphasis added). 
On March 14, 2008, Bernard filed his Motion for Summary Judgment Requesting 
Distribution of Sales Proceeds to Trust (the "Motion for Summary Judgment Requesting 
Distribution"). (R. at 539-540.) The Motion for Summary Judgment Requesting 
Distribution requested distribution of the sales proceeds to the Trust because the 
Blackhawk Property was an asset of the Trust, therefore pursuant to the express terms of 
the Trust, the proceeds of the sale of the Blackhawk Property, a Trust asset, must be 
placed in the Trust and administered in accordance with the terms of the Trust. (R. at 
540-551.) 
On April 21, 2008, following a trial on the merits, the district court entered its 
Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order Granting Bernard J. Myers Petition for 
Appointment as Personal Representative of the Eva L. Myers Estate and Dismissal of 
Complaint of Allan G. Birch, Glenn L. Birch and James Birch Against Bernard J. Myers, 
Individually and as Named Trustee of the Bernard J. Myers and Eva L. Myers Revocable 
Trust and Does 1-4 (the "Final Order"). (R. at 683-687.) The Final Order, in pertinent 
part, granted Bernard's Motion for Summary Judgment Requesting Distribution and 
amended the Order for Sale by ordering the sales proceeds from the sale of the 
Blackhawk Property to be distributed to the trustee of the Trust, Bernard, and 
administered in accordance with the terms of the Trust. (R. at 686.) 
The Birch Brothers now claim that the verbal agreement, described above, that 
resulted in the Order for Sale, was not an order of the district court, but rather a 
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stipulation of the parties and that the district court lacks the authority to modify a 
"stipulation" of the parties. (Br. of Birch Brothers at 8.) 
A bench trial was conducted on the merits on April 1 through April 2 of 2008 
("Trial") to fully adjudicate the Birch Complaint and the Petition for Formal Probate and 
Appointment. Because the district court ordered that the Blafckhawk Property be sold, the 
district court determined that the sole issue that remained for trial, in order to fully 
adjudicate the Birch Complaint and the Petition for Formil Probate and Appointment, 
was whether Bernard was an incapacitated person and Enable to serve as personal 
representative of Eva's estate and as trustee of the Trust. (R. at 719, 5:14-24.) 
At Trial the district court had ample opportunity to determine for itself whether 
Bernard was an incapacitated person and not able to serve as personal representative and 
trustee of the Trust as Bernard testified extensively on matters involving the 
administration of the Trust, Eva's estate and the administration thereof, management of 
Bernard's personal financial affairs, as well as the financial affairs of the trust and 
Bernard's ability to manage the affairs of his daily life. (1^. at 719-720, 246-297, 393-
419.) 
Bernard's personal physician, Dr. Margaret Lunt, testified that: (1) she had seen 
Bernard between two and four times a year for the past eight or nine years; (2) that 
Bernard was capable of giving informed consent—the ability to make a decision based on 
the facts presented that will impact him and others; (3) Bernard has the ability to weigh 
different options and make decisions; and (4) she administered a mini-mental exam to 
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Bernard, a screen for dementia, in the fall of 2007 and Bernard scored a 30 out of 30. (R. 
at 719, 127-128.) 
Bernard's son, Gary Myers, and his daughter-in-law, Jane Myers, testified as to 
Bernard's ability to successfully perform a variety of activities and his ability to 
successfully manage financial affairs. (R. at 720, 297-393.) 
At the conclusion of Trial, the district court found the testimony of Dr. Margaret 
Lunt credible and further found that her testimony, that Mr. Myers is medically 
competent and does have the mental ability to process information and make informed 
decisions, persuasive and the district court accepted such testimony and recommendation 
from a qualified physician in that regard. (R. at 720, 432: 24-25 through 433:1-4.) The 
district court further found that Bernard, as a result of the testimony that was heard, is not 
impaired and that the Birch Brothers failed to meet their burden of proving that Bernard 
is incapacitated. (R. at 720,433:5-16.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The Birch Brother's have failed to establish that the district court erred in 
determining that the Notice of Interest was a wrongful lien. The issues raised in the 
Birch Brother's appeal were not preserved because the Birch Brothers failed to file a 
request to submit their Motion for Reconsideration and did not otherwise raise the 
arguments made in their appellate brief before the district court. Therefore this Court 
should affirm the trial court's decision as it relates to the wrongful lien 
2. No legal authority exists to support the proposition advanced by the Birch 
Brothers that a petition for appointment of a personal representative and probate of a will 
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should be dismissed if the estate of a deceased person h^s no assets and no factual 
support exists in the record to support the Birch Brothers unsubstantiated assertion that 
Eva's estate did not have any assets at the time of her deaths therefore the district court's 
denial of the Birch Brothers' motion to dismiss the Petition for Formal Probate and 
Appointment should be upheld. 
3. The Birch Brothers' argument that the district court lacked the authority to 
modify a stipulation is without merit because the agreement embodied in the district 
court's Order for Sale, which was agreed to as to form by counsel for the Birch Brother, 
expressly provided that the proceeds from the sale of the Blackhawk Property would not 
be distributed other than by joint agreement or further order of the district court. 
4. The district court's determination that Bernard was not an incapacitated 
person should be upheld because it was supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
5. The unsubstantiated allegation that Bernard repioved $7,516.72 from Eva's 
account, a Trust account, cannot form a basis for an appeal because a vague and arguable 
reference to a point in the district court proceeding does not preserve the issue on appeal. 
6. The district court's Order of Sale mooted all blaims presented in the Birch 
Complaint, except for the issue of Bernard's incapacity to serve as trustee, which was 
adjudicated at the Trial, therefore the district court's dismissal of the Birch Complaint 
should be upheld. 
7. The Birch Brothers rely on facts not in the record, failed to marshal the 
evidence and make arguments in direct contravention of established Utah case law and 
Utah statutes, therefore the Birch Brothers' appeal is frivolous and Bernard is entitled to 
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an award of attorney fees and double costs pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
8. The trial court abused its discretion by reducing the attorney fees originally 
awarded pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-4 and the court's Finding of Facts, 
Conclusions of law and Order Granting Bernard J. Myers' Petition to Nullify Wrongful 
Lien initially entered on December 3, 2007, by sua sponte and without providing any 
explanation in the reducing the amount of fees awarded. 
9. The trial court erred in rescinding the award of statutory damages in the 
amount of $1,000.00 previously awarded on December 3, 2007 and mandated by Utah 
Code Ann. §38-9-4. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION THAT THE NOTICE OF 
INTEREST CONSTITUTED A WRONGFUL LIEN WAS IN STRICT 
CONFORMANCE WITH UTAH CODE ANN, §38-9-1 ET SEP. AND 
THEREFORE SHOULD BE UPHELD. 
The Birch Brothers assert that the district court erred in ruling that the Notice of 
Interest was a Wrongful Lien because: (1) The Petition to Nullify was signed by counsel 
for Bernard; (2) The Petition to Nullify was not verified by affidavit; (3) The Petition to 
Nullify was not served upon Allan G. Birch, but rather was served upon counsel for Allan 
G. Birch; (4) an amendment to Utah Code § 38-9-1 et seq., excepted a notice of interest 
from the purview of the statute; and (5) Allan G. Birch is an interest holder. (Br. of 
Appellant at 9-14.) 
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Arguments one through 4 presented above, aside from lacking merit, were not 
preserved on appeal, because none of the arguments were raised before the district court, 
as the Motion for Reconsideration never came before the district court because it was 
never submitted to the district court as required by Rule 7(4) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The sole argument raised in the district court b^ Allan G. Birch was that the 
Notice of Interest was not a wrongful lien because Allan G. Birch had a vested interest in 
the Blackhawk Property. (R. at 251-257, R. at 717, 11:11-15.) Allan G. Birch did file a 
Motion to Reconsider, raising a portion of the issues raised in this appeal for the first 
time, but a request to submit for decision was never filed in the district court. (R. at 480.) 
Rule 7(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part, that, "If 
no party files a request [request to submit], the motion will not be submitted for 
decision." Utah R. Civ. P. 7(d). Therefore, because issues one through four, described 
above, were neither raised in Allan G. Birch's objection to the Petition to Nullify nor 
during the hearing on the wrongful lien, but rather were rrierely raised in the Motion to 
Reconsider, which was never submitted, issues one through four were not preserved for 
appeal. 
In the alternative, in the event this Court determines such issues were properly 
preserved, each of the issues raised by Allan G. Birch with respect to the district court's 
determination that the Notice of Interest was a Wrongful Lien, lacks merit. 
First, Allan G. Birch, without any authority, claims that the Petition to Nullify was 
not signed by Bernard and was not supported by an affidavit, therefore it is ineffectual in 
stating a claim to nullify a wrongful lien. Rule 11(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
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Procedure provides, "Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be signed by 
at least one attorney of record, or, if the party is not represented, by the party. Utah R. 
Civ. P. 11(a). Because Bernard was represented by counsel, Rule 11 required that the 
Petition to Nullify be signed by one of his attorneys of record and if Bernard had signed 
the Petition to Nullify, it would have been a violation of the Rule 5(b)(1) of Civil 
Procedure. Further, Utah Code Ann. §38-9-1 et seq. does not contain a requirement that 
a petition to nullify a wrongful lien be signed by the record interest holder, as opposed to 
counsel for the record interest holder, therefore the Birch Brothers' argument that the 
Notice of Interest was not a wrongful lien because the Petition to Nullify was signed by 
counsel, is frivolous. 
Second, the Petition to Nullify was supported by the sworn affidavit of Bernard, as 
trustee of the Trust, the record interest holder and each and every factual statement 
contained in the Petition to Nullify was supported by Bernard's sworn affidavit. (R. at 
124-136.) Therefore, the Birch Brother's claim that [the record interest holder] did not 
verify the same by Affidavit is wholly inaccurate. (Br. of Appellant at 9.) 
Third, Utah Code Ann. §3 8-9-7(3)(c) provides, "The record interest holder shall 
serve a copy of the petition on the lien claimant and a notice of the hearing pursuant to 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4, Process." Rule 5(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure provides, "If a party is represented by an attorney, service shall be made upon 
the attorney unless service upon the party is ordered by the court." Utah R. Civ. P. 
5(b)(1). In this case Edward Garret was, and remains, the attorney of record for Allan G. 
Birch and the district court did not order that service be perfect in a manner other than 
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pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. K loreover, there is I Jtah jurisprudence 
diic^Liv on point to this issue. Because service dii ectly upon a represented par t:> \ v c iild 
\ iolatc an attorney 's etl ileal di ities ai id w 01 lid be inconsistent with the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, sen ice oi'a petition lor a wrongful lien must be made upon the attorney for 
the lien claimant .ve {..ententtn- , . • *, . NuttalL \f i 
K 
Fourth, although the amendments to § 38-9-1 et seq. cannot apply retroactively to 
dcn\ J partx of his rights, thai were prc\J«.'Usly awarded 1\\ Ihc disincl u>ur' Ml n G 
Unci, ini.-vstaie^ the purpose A ^ _UW* ank. .ainu.. 
Utal 1 Code ^\ i n 1 § 38 9 1 w as amended for the pi irpo; ui making ii explicitly ueai wiiai 
Utah courts ha\e lone held, that a notice of interest is a wrongful lien. Section 18-0 •('>). 
as amenuLu *.-• ut JUihS ^cnuai oc^um. ,jio\kko tlua a. *A\iunglu» JKII aieans any 
interest in cerium real property. . . . ^lak Code Ann. £ 38-9-1 (6) (2008;. More^.ei 
Utah courts, even before the express inclusion of a notices of interest in the definitioi i of 
notice of interest was not authorized by statute, a notice of interest constitutes a wrongful 
lien. See Russell v. Thomasf 2000 UT App 82, 999 P.2d 1244; Commercial Inv. Corp. v. 
Stgfri*. 
Fifth, Allan G. Birch does not possess a vested ownership interest in the 
Blackhawk Property, therefore the Notice of Interest constitutes a wrongful lien, I Jtah 
C otu. Ann.
 s --• • o* . definedawrongu.il en as: 
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any document that purports to create a lien or encumbrance 
on an owner's interest in certain real property and at the time 
it is recorded or filed is not: 
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or 
federal statute; 
(b) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of 
a court of competent jurisdiction in the state; or 
(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document 
signed by the owner of the real property. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1 (6)(2007) (emphasis added). 
Allan G. Birch does not claim that the Notice of Interest is not a wrongful lien 
because he is an owner of the Blackhawk Property, but rather claims the Notice of 
Interest is not a Wrongful Lien because he is a beneficial owner or an "Interest Holder." 
Allan G. Birch further claims to have a vested interest in the Blackhawk Property, but 
does not claim to have a vested ownership interest in the Blackhawk Property, as required 
by Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1(3). Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1(3) defines an owner as, "a 
person who has a vested ownership interest in certain real property." Utah Code Ann. 
§38-9-1(3) (emphasis added). "Vested ownership" is defined as Ownership in which 
title is perfect; absolute ownership." Black's Law Diet, at 1131 (7th ed. 1999). 
"Ownership" is defined as "The collection of rights allowing one to use and enjoy 
property, including the right to convey it to others." Id. 
Consistent with the district court's First Lien Order, Allan G. Birch possesses a 
future interest in the Trust, which is subject to total divestment and does not hold a vested 
interest in the Blackhawk Property. (R. at 393.) The Blackhawk Property was an asset of 
the Trust, Allan G. Birch is a contingent beneficiary of the Trust, but does not possess 
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any current right to any particular asset held b> tl le Trust or Trust income. Allan G. 
Hii'di did not June the right lo use or cnjo) Ihc Biackkmk 1'iopnh Hi I iillmit i nn< ill! 
tl: ie ti :  fc n: e /:\ Hi u: , G Bi i :1 ,. was not an owner of the Blackhawk P n M V I V within the 
meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1(3),. To hold otherwise would sanction precisely the 
type wi nusuuci ihv. Utah Wrongful I Jen Statute seeks to prevent 1 he uusiei ol a HUM 
by Utah Code Ann >^~"M03(iXh;> ^ manage the assets in accordance with the l a m s 
of the Trust and the prudun investor ni«, , ^^.i .onhngeu L^ijcliuai) w. ,i ! rust were 
i I III|H HI 
t j i e assets of the trust, the trustee of the trust would be required to obtain the consent of 
the contingent beneficiaries before selling trust assets and reinvesting them in accordance 
\* It'll the best inte-
beneficiaries of a trust. Such a result is clearly contrary to the purpose of having a trustee 
and contrary to the policy and purpose of Utah's wrongful lien statute. 
For the reasons stated above, Allan < i liiuli :. appeal nl I he h r . l I 1V11 i Nilri a. 
w ithoi it merit and the First Lien Order should be upheld. 
H- THE DISTRICT COURT'S DENIAL OF THE BIRCH BROTHERS' 
MOTION TO DISMISS IS UNSUPPORTED BV THE UTAH PROBATE 
CODE AND CITES FACTS NOT IN THE RECORD, THEREFORE THE 
DISTRICT COURT'S DISMISSAL SHOULD BE UPHELD BECAUSE 
EVEN AN ESTATE WITHOUT ASSETS MUST BE PROBATED . 
The Hind. Hrothers filed a Motion ! r I Hsmiss "ii November 2H. ?i)\*x vi'i—u* 
citing an;, icg., : *•.:., s- I 
Petition for Formal Probate and Appointment must be dismissed (R at 382-385.) 
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First, the Birch Brothers fail to satisfy their marshalling duty as they have failed to 
provide any support in the record for their conclusion that Eva's estate did not possess 
any assets. There is no requirement under the Utah Uniform Probate Code that an estate 
be solvent before a personal representative can be appointed, yet the Birch Brothers claim 
that Bernard was required to prove that there were assets in Eva's estate before he could 
be appointed as personal representative. The Birch Brothers conceded that at the time of 
Eva's death, Eva's estate had personal property and other assets. (Br. of Appellant at 13, 
14.) 
Furthermore, if Part V of the Birch Brother Appellate Brief had merit, the claim 
that Eva had $7,516.72 in a non-trust account, those fund would be subject to probate, 
thereby mooting Part II of the Birch Brothers' Appellate Brief, the claim that Eva's estate 
did not have any probate assets. The Birch Brothers' are speaking out of both sides of 
their mouths. In one breath they make a claim that Bernard took $7,516.72 from Eva's 
account, a claim that was vaguely made and never pursued in the district court, and in the 
next breath they claim that Eva's probate estate contained no assets therefore the district 
court erred in failing to dismiss the Petition for Formal Probate and Appointment. 
Clearly, both claims cannot be true. 
Second, the Birch Brothers' argument is circular because a person cannot 
investigate the extent of the estate until such person is appointed as personal 
representative of the estate and given the powers associated with such appointment. 
Without the powers commensurate with being appointed as a personal representative, a 
person is incapable of ascertaining the location and extent of the assets of an estate. For 
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example, a bank will not disclose information as textile existence of an account or the 
extent of the assets in an account,- absent presentniei it c f letters testamentary, * hich are 
--• " . . . . ** - . . . . , . -iresentative. Therefore, until a 
personal representathc i- -ippomu d n ^annol he determined, with any degree of 
certain! \. iik. nature and extent o\ .» w^^ -.K>VM S assets. 
Second, III ' ilul'i 'Il  .in prrsoiiiil nr|»n sciilnliu i, IIIIIHII r -,< IIISIN v\\ in ulirJi iliiilli llln 
assets of an estate. Some of the duties of the personal representative are: (1) to take 
possession ar.*J control ~r *u~ decedent's pror~rt^ TTtah Code \r~ §75-3-708; 
Code Aim. % 7:>-J-VU 3: \ l) publish notice to creditor Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-801, and ic 
satisfy the bona fide claims of creditors. 
Even if an estate is • ' Itl: ic i it asse ts because si i :li assets wei e distrit i ited p :: st 
mortem., as is claimed here, a personal representative's duties are not limited to acting in 
the best interest of heirs and devisees. A personal, representative must also po.si IM-'I^ 
and satisfy the bona fide claims of creditors ' I he issue of w hethei Ev a' s estate has assets 
death of a decedent and includes a review of pre-death transfers, 
i ui me reasons stated abo\ e, the district court's denial of the Bii ch Brother's 
MHi'""ii («i Dismiss siinitH h uplirlil 
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III. THE ORDER FOR SALE WAS A STIPULATED COURT ORDER, 
NONETHELESS THE DISTRICT COURT POSSESSES THE 
AUTHORITY TO MODIFY ITS OWN ORDER. 
The Birch Brothers argument that the district court erred in annulling the 
stipulation of the parties by amending the Order for Sale is frivolous because no 
stipulation was ever entered into not to modify the Order for Sale and the Final Order was 
issued in accordance with the express terms of the Order for Sale. 
First, the Birch Brothers' claims that a stipulation was reached as a result of 
mediation is troublesome for the very reason that a stipulation was never entered into by 
the parties during the course of mediation. The parties reached an agreement at a 
hearing, which was embodied in the Order for Sale. This is more than apparent from a 
reading of the transcript of the hearing in which the agreement regarding the sale of the 
Blackhawk Property was reached. See (R. at 718, 11:18-25, 12:1-11.) 
Second, the Birch Brothers, in violation of the confidentiality requirements of 
mediation, attempt to assert that a stipulation was reached, impliedly during mediation, 
and the Order for Sale is an embodiment of such stipulation. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 lb-8 
(Supp. 2007) provides that mediation proceeding are designed to "encourage[] informal 
and confidential exchange among the persons present to facilitate resolution of the 
dispute." Utah Code Ann. §78-3 lb-8 (Supp. 2007). "Confidentiality of all 
communications between the parties or among them and the mediator serves the 
important public policy of promoting a broad discussion of potential resolutions to the 
matters being mediated." Wilmington Hospitality, L.L.C v. New Castle County, 788 
A.2d 536, 541 (Del. Ch. 2001). 
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Third, Utah Code Ann § 78-31 b-7(3)(a) (Supp. 2007) provides that "any 
settl.em.ent agreement bet \ veeii the par ties as a i esi ill; : f 11 lediatioi 1 i i: iay be e :: i:e c .1 ite d in: 1 
w riting. file d w itl 1 tl le clerk of the court, and enforceable as a judgment of the court." 
The Utah Supreme Court recently stated: 
...only agreements executed .n vsnung wn, no enforceable 
as a judgment of the court." A court cannot enforce the terms 
of an oral agreement reached in mediation without requiring 
parties to disclose, and the court to consider, confidential 
settlement negotiations. Absent the existence of an exception, 
we ai c not pr epa.it • invade t!^  * onfidentiality 
protections afforded parties to mediation in this manner. A 
rule permitting courts to enforce only written mediation 
agreements operates in tandem., with tl: i..e n il.es providing 
mediation confidentiality. 
Reese v. Tingey Constr. 2008 UTSC 20060594 - 0201.08 (emphasis added). 
to prepare a comprehensive, final settlement agreement free from misunderstandings and 
ambiguities. This ' . Uicularly important in the mediation context where "parties are 
often encouraL. , 
"informal atmospiiere * whcic parlies need to be iwmmUcd oi the import ol Jieir final 
nods of assent (and] sitminu a wrilinjz is a iniplo forntalih that most people under land 
as a 1 ..iUuiuac. ...i. ; ;^a^,i,. ;./;,,., _ v ; Meu.Mca •settlement Agreement. 
Vernon \ Aciun 1 >2 N.h 2d So MlU ilnd. 2iMM)> ("'Requiring written agreements, 
signed by the parties, is more like!; to nuniitam mediation as a viable avenue f or clear 
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and enduring dispute resolution rather than one leading to further uncertainty and 
conflict.") 
It is clear from the above quoted sources that if this Court were to entertain mere 
claims that a purported "stipulation" was achieved during mediation where the Birch 
Brothers admil that no progress was made, mediation would lose all viability as an 
effective dispute resolution mechanism. Therefore, any claim that some sort of 
"stipulation" was reached during mediation, must be disregarded. 
Fourth, With respect to the proceeds upon a sale of the Blackhawk Property, the 
parties agreed as follows: 
The Court: . . . Then let's go ahead and I assume you're in 
agreement we can order it [the sales proceeds] be placed in an 
account that can't be withdrawn without consent of both 
parties and they'd have to each sign. 
Mr. Alderman: That'd be fine, Your Honor. 
The Court: Or court order. Okay? 
s 
Mr. Garrett: That's the underlying point there, Your Honor, 
that before any of it could be withdrawn, it must be shown 
that there is a need on the part of the petitioner. 
The Court: Well, I would assume that you're both in 
agreement that the money ought to be withdrawn that that 
condition would be met. I would also make the assumption 
that if you don't agree to have it withdrawn and you can 
know you can come to the Court for the court orders, we'll 
cross that bridge on that day for whatever the need may or 
may not be and then I can make the ultimate determination as 
to whether or not the funds should be withdrawn. 
Mr. Garrett: That's fine. 
(R. at 718, 11,12:18-25,1-11.) 
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Pursuant to the above described agreement, not a stipulation entered into as the 
terms of which were agreed to as to form by counsel for Allan G. Birch. Pursuant to the 
Order for Sale, the district court ordered that the Blackhawk Property be sold and "the 
proceeds of the sale described in paragraph 4 shall be placed Ii 1 an ii iterest bear ing 
account be made onh pursuant i** a i«unl simulation ol'ihe parties or further order - / ~ <• 
.* ihi. ixiicjii i>i ikiiidiu M ; U , .^ n •; /; +95) (emphasis added). 
< >!i 1^  I . m i l I III, !(H)K, I U T I M H I I ' M o d u l i lui S u m m i m iu i l i ' i i in i l I ' u i u r . l i i u . ' 
Distribution. (R. at 539-540'.) ' I he Motion . _ nummary Judgment Requesting 
Distribution requested distribution ~r *hr sales proceeds tr fV ^ r r t because the 
. :. • • * . ! ' - : - . . - re fore pi lr v% / 
the trust, the proceeds of the sale of the Blackhawk Property, a I rust asset, must be 
placed in lite Trust and administered in accordance with the terms of the Trust .T \\ 
I lie exf ;,M.- .>' il.c Oidei lui Sale pi ,»* M> d iui a distribution of the sales 
proceeds in a man net P * i^e< ? lor by a future u*uii - id '"his is precisely the authority 
by winch ilit luwl * >rdci ordered the sales proceeds uom the sale oi UK, iblackhawk 
the terms td the I ru>< ff< at 686.) In essence, the l;inal (»rder did ;• • annul the OiUei 
foi Sale, which embodied the agreement of the parties, but rather was issued pursuant to 
tl: ic c: xpress ten i is : f the Oi dei for Sale. 
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Because counsel for the Birch Brothers agreed to terms of the Order for Sale and 
the Final Order is consistent with the provisions of the Order for Sale, which was not a 
stipulation between the parties achieved during mediation, the Birch Brothers arguments 
lack merit. Therefore the provisions o the District Court's Order pertaining to 
distribution of the sale proceeds from the Blackhawk Property should be upheld. 
IV. THE FACTUAL DETERMINATION OF THE DISTRICT COURT, THAT 
BERNARD IS NOT AN INCAPACITATED PERSON SHOULD BE 
UPHELD. 
Factual determinations of the trial court will not be disturbed unless they are 
clearly erroneous. Van Dyke v. Chappell 818 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Utah 1991) (citations 
omitted). "In making such a determination, we consider the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the trial court. We recite the facts in accordance with that standard.5' Id. 
The Birch Brothers, in contravention of Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, have failed to marshal the evidence to show that the district court's factual 
determination of Bernard's competency was clearly erroneous. 
The Advisory Committee Notes to rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure provide, in pertinent part: 
To successfully appeal a trial court's findings of fact, 
appellate counsel must play the devil's advocate. 'Attorneys 
must extricate themselves from the client's shoes and fully 
assume the adversary's position. In order to properly 
discharge the marshalling duty, the challenger must present, 
in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of 
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the 
very findings the appellant resists. 
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Tr
 * ~ \^^ " 24 advison conim. Notes (emphasis added) (citations 
0! i litteci). 
At Trial, the district court had ample opportunih to determine for ilsc-f wh. ': 
Bernard was an incapacitated person.,, as 1: le testified extensb el) oi I n latter s in v ol v ing the 
administration of the I n ist , i i lanagement of his own financial affairs as well as those of 
the Trust and his ability to manage the affairs of his daily life. (R. at 720, 246-297r ^93-
419.) Bernard's personal physician, I <i l> I HI aiet I nut, testified ina* • • -•• nud seen 
Raii i inl bt lwrni i ill1 H I ilium! II ii! 111111 i i II 
Bernard could give informed consent the ability to make a decision based on the facts 
presented that w:V. impact him and others: (3) has the ability to weigh different options 
for dementia, in the fall of 2007 and Bernard scored a 30 out of 30. (R. ai ll'j, 127 ; ^ 3 . , 
Bernard's son, Gary Myers., and his daughter-in-law, Jane M^ers, testified as to Bernard's 
affairs. (R. at 720, 297-393.) 
At the conclusion of Trial, the district cou-' ~--.::d the testimony of Dr Margaret 
Lunt credible ai id further foui id that hei testimony that IV if IV !> ei s is medicall} 
competent and does have the mental ability > tc > process it lformatioi i and make infoi med 
HHIX persuasive and the court accepted such testimony and recommendation from a 
qudi.iicu physician ii I tl mt regard, (R at ; '20, 432: 24 25, 433:1- 1) 1 1 le disti ict coi irt 
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the Birch Brothers failed to meet their burden of proving that Bernard is incompetent. 
(R. at 720, 433:5-16.) 
Except for a passing reference to the testimony of Dr. Lunt, the Birch Brothers 
failed to present, in their appellate brief, even a shred of the above described competent 
evidence, but instead focused on the testimony of their witnesses, a nurse and a social 
worker who attempted to present their unqualified diagnoses that Bernard suffered from 
dementia. 
Further, the Birch Brothers cite as error the exclusion of testimony of Heather 
Bittenger, a social worker, and Dee Horn, a nurse, that Bernard was incompetent. First, 
the testimony of a lay witness is limited to opinions and inferences which are rationally 
based on the witness's perception and helpful to the fact finder to clearly understand the 
witness's testimony or to determine a fact in issue." -State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 547 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998). Lay witnesses, however, cannot tell the fact finder what result to 
reach or give legal conclusions. Id. As applied to this appeal, the Birch Brothers cite as 
error the district courts' exclusion of testimony of Heather Bittenger and Dee Horn as to 
the ultimate determination, Bernard's incapacity. Clearly, lay witnesses cannot testify to 
such matters, that determination is for the finder of fact. 
Second, pursuant to In re Kessler: 
But when there are some underlying facts from which the jury 
could draw an inference of other than normal mental 
condition, then whether there is sufficient foundation for the 
expression of an opinion by the lay witness or whether such 
opinion would be helpful to the jury rests almost altogether 
in the judicial discretion of the trial judge. 
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In re Kesler, 702 P.2d 86? 94 i Utah !'•>*-; ; moling In r<- Hanson's Estate, 52 P.2d 110~ 
1115-16(1 Hah 1 (.> b ) (emphasis addud). 
TbiTdbiv «"11111 '»SSIHHIH IIK'K ^'i funjvi |iii|.ii.|;i(i.iiii. I.1, J "JHIUI HI.1 li.ii.i i 
Heather Bittenger to state a conclusion, the trial court exclusion of conclusion testimony, 
rests almost altogether in the judicial discretion of the trial court, As applied to tl lis case, 
ha\r Lin mi mi m a r s h a l i i / u m l i i n l n i u 1 s i i l Y i n a i l I i i | ) | n i 
determination that proper foundation existed to permit such a conclusion, let alone to 
overcome the substantial discretion the district court possesses in determining whether to 
perm*: me ciiii; : ,m . . . • imiwJ.y. 
Because the d^trici couit 5 determination was supported by substantial evidence, 
the Birch Brothers have failed to demonstrate that the district court's determination of 
competency was dearly erroneous, Likewise, the Birch Biothus hau iailul lo 
ilnii1 'Hwdad <!•• '•, d-r'-- • ; n' , , " hsni'li'-M sliirh discretion resls almost 
altogether with the disinu unni m piecluding a social worker and a nurse from opining 
as to the ulti.rn.ate question in u»^ v. r><- IK district coui t's determination that Bernard is 
in 11 * I null iiH apacilad •* 1 (HTSOII SIIMIIIII 1 * upiirM. 
V. THE BIRCH BROTHERS' CLAIM THAT BERNARD REMOVED 
$7,526.72 FROM EVA'S ACCOUNT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE 
RECORD AND IS TOO VAGUE TO PRESERVE THE ISSUE ON 
APPEAL. 
Because there is no st'nporl in the record of the district court proceedings that 
Bernard was not entitled to administer the $7,516.72 alleged to have been removed from 
Eva's account, such claim is not preserved on appeal. 
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First, "In order to preserve an issue for appeal, it fmust be raised in a timely 
fashion, must be specifically raised such that the issue is sufficiently raised to a level of 
consciousness before the trial court, and must be supported by evidence or relevant legal 
authority; " State v. Richins, 2004 UT App 36, f8, 86 P.3d 759. Second, a "[v]ague, 
arguable references to [a] point in the district court proceedings do n o t . . . preserve the 
issue on appeal." Lyons v. Jefferson Bank & Trust, 994 F.2d 716, 721 (10th Cir. 
1993)(quotation omitted; alteration in original). "Similarly, we have held that where an 
issue is raised but not pursued in the trial court, it cannot be the basis for the appeal." Id. 
at 722. The sole reference to the Birch Brothers claim is contained in one question 
during the Trial. (R. at 720, 296:11-16.) Further such claim was never pursued further. 
Second, Bernard as the trustee of the Trust and as named personal representative 
was entitled to administer the aforementioned funds. Therefore, even in the event the 
Birch Brothers were capable of establishing that Bernard took charge of such funds from 
Eva's account, as personal representative of the estate or trustee of the Trust, Bernard had 
the authority to take charge of such funds. 
Because the issue was not preserved or pursued in district court, such issue cannot 
form a basis for this appeal. 
VI. EACH AND EVERY ISSUE CONTAINED IN THE BIRCH COMPLAINT 
WAS EITHER MOOTED BY THE ORDER FOR SALE OR 
ADJUDICATED AT TRIAL, THEREFORE THE BIRCH BROTHERS1 
CLAIM OF ERROR IN DISMISSING THEIR COMPLAINT LACKS 
MERIT. 
The Birch Complaint asserted the following three causes of action: (1) that 
Bernard was mentally incapacitated and therefore should be removed as trustee of the 
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Trust; (2) that Bernard, as trustee of the Trust,, did not possess ilie authority to sell the 
i,kK,.Jiu^k :v •• ; •* conversion of the Blackhawk I 'roperty. (R of ca se 
\s held h\ ihc dislnci coart, the Order for Sale mooted claims t\\ o and three of the 
Bnci i oiiiplaiiit neeuuse tlu llu^n i.sothers agreed atK iMtu.r.imv>k Property could be 
iiillil I i llcniaii! ih 1 irImi ,li i Il III Iimihf IIHTHOH ill 1  "i itun i IIMHI llinill Mrmiinl II,II Il 
express authority to sell the Blackhawk Property and a claim for conversion could not 
proceed. The sole claim alleged in the Birch Complaint that remained was the removal of 
a\i.- Mon that Bciiiaid was mcuidlty incapacitated and unable to serve as trustee of the 
1 rusi The requisite level < r cumpetencv for service as a personal representative is 
: - M\ 'os me wiuci IUI bale, tu wlnUi counsel for the linen l3iuthcn> agreed iu as 
to form, and the district court's determination that Bernard has sufficient mental can-u ii\ 
to serve as personal representative oi the estate of Eva, complete! \ adjudicaUu ui. -,» ms 
raise'!1 in (lie Mirrli ( 'umpl.'iml 
For the reasons stated above, the district court's dismissal of the Birch Complaint 
should be upheld. 
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VII. PURSUANT TO RULE 33 THIS COURT SHOULD AWARD BERNARD 
JUST DAMAGES, INCLUDING DOUBLE COSTS AND REASONABLE 
ATTORNEY FEES BECAUSE EACH CLAIM CONTAINED IN THE 
BIRCH BROTHERS5 APPEAL IS FRIVOLOUS. 
As demonstrated above, the Birch Brothers appeal contains arguments that are 
directly contrary to established Utah jurisprudence and directly contrary to Utah statutory 
law. Further, the Birch Brothers failed to marshal the evidence and their arguments are, 
to a large extent, supported by purported facts not in the record and their arguments are 
not supported by any legal authority. In essence, the Birch Brothers present the rulings of 
the district court, fail to provide any support, either factual or legal, as to why the district 
court erred and ask this Court to determine whether such arguments have any legal 
support or factual support. The Birch Brothers failed to cite statutes, case law and facts 
in the record that are directly in opposite to the position taken in this appeal. 
Rule 33 provides, in pertinent part: 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first 
appeal of right in a criminal case, if the court determines that 
a motion made or appeal taken under these rules is either 
frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, which may 
include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or 
reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court 
may order that the damages be paid by the party or by the 
party's attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous 
appeal, motion, brief, or other paper is one that is not 
grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not 
based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or 
reverse existing law. 
Utah R.App. P. 33(a) & (b). 
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As applied to this case, the Birch Brother have repeatedly asserted arguments 
directly in opposite to Utah statutes and case law. Moreover, each argument advanced 
contains facts not in evidence and each argument fails to cite to facts in the record that 
are contrary to the Birch Brothers positions taken on appeal. Moreover, certain of the 
Birch Brother's positions contain misstatements. For example, the Birch Brothers claim 
that Bernard failed to file an affidavit in support of the Petition to Nullify. Clearly, 
Bernard's sworn affidavit was filed in the district court and each and ever fact stated in 
the Petition to Nullify was supported by Bernard's affidavit. (R. at 124-130.) Therefore, 
pursuant to the plain and unambiguous language of Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure this Court should award Bernard reasonable attorney fees and 
double costs. 
VIII. THE TRIAL COURT'S REDUCTION OF ATTORNEY FEES WITHOUT 
PROVIDING ANY INDICATION OR EXPLANATION AS TO HOW IT 
ARRIVED AT THE REDUCED AMOUNT CONSTITUTES A CLEAR 
ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
The trial court's reduction of attorney fees previously awarded pursuant to the 
court's Finding of Facts, Conclusions of law and Order Granting Bernard J. Myers' 
Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien initially entered on December 3, 2007, without 
providing any explanation for such reduction, constitutes a clear abuse of discretion. It is 
acknowledged that, "calculation of reasonable attorney fees is in the sound discretion of 
the trial court, and will not be overturned in the absence of a showing of a clear abuse of 
discretion." Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988) (citation 
omitted). 
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While it is clear that a trial court has considerable discretion in calculating 
reasonable attorney fees, the trial court must make findings to explain the reduction of 
attorney fees and demonstrate that the court utilized the proper factors for reducing such 
fees. Govert Copier Painting v. Van Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163, 174 (Utah App. 1990). "We 
have held that unless the court offers an explanation for the reduction of the attorney fees 
requested in a case where there is adequate and uncontroverted evidence in the record to 
support the fees, it abuses its discretion." Id. (citing Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. 
Reichert, 784 P.2d 1210, 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)); Martindale v. Adams, 111 P.2d 
514, 518 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Dixie State Bank at 987-91. 
As applied to this case, on November 7. 2007 counsel for Bernard J. Myers 
submitted an Affidavit of Attorney Fees and Costs on Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien 
(the "Affidavit"), which provided a detailed description of the services performed, the 
hourly rate of the attorneys and paralegal performing such services and the amount of 
time expended by the respective attorney or paralegal in performing such services. (R. at 
348-354) The Affidavit cited the four factors outlined by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988) and its progeny and provided a 
detailed analysis of each of the four factors. 
The sole opposition to the amount of attorney fees requested by Bernard J. Myers 
was an unsupported assertion contained in Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration of 
the Minute Order Nullifying the Notice of Interest and to Strike the Proposed Findings of 
Fact Conclusions of Law and Order Submitted by Bernard J. Myers filed on November 
15, 2007 (the "Motion to Reconsider") (R. at 365-371.) The Motion to Reconsider states: 
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Even further, the attorney fees requested by Parsons Behle & 
Latimer are not reasonable. The attorneys in this case 
prepared, filed and argued a motion before the Court. In no 
way should this consume $11,000.00 of attorney's time, if it 
did, then the time involved is not reasonable for this type of 
proceeding. This conclusion is clearly evident on the 
document submitted.. 
(R. at 370.) 
The Motion to Reconsider is conclusory and provides no support for Allan G. 
Birch's assertion that the attorneys fees requested were unreasonable. Id. Moreover, the 
unsupported claim that the requested amount of attorney fees was unreasonable was 
presented in a motion to reconsider, which was never submitted to the district court and 
which the Utah Supreme Court has described as follows: 
The filing of post judgment motions to reconsider has become 
a common litigation practice, notwithstanding the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure's failure to authorize it and our previous 
attempts to discourage i t . . . . [We] warned that this practice 
could "seriously compromise" the position of a litigant. 
Gillett v. Price, 2006 UT 24, f 1, 135 P.3d 861. 
On December 3, 2007, the trial court, presumably finding that the requested 
amount of attorney fees were reasonable, awarded Bernard J Myers the full amount of 
attorney fees requested (R. at 391-394.) On April 7, the trial court, sua sponte, entered a 
second Finding of Facts, Conclusions of law and Order Granting Bernard J. Myers' 
Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien (the "Second Lien Order"), which reduced the amount 
of attorney fees previously awarded to Bernard J. Myers. (R. at 676-679.) The trial 
court's Second Lien Order does not make findings to explain the reduction in attorney 
fees nor does it demonstrate that it utilized the proper factors in reducing the fees. 
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Because the Affidavit provided a detailed analysis of each of the four factors 
outline in Dixie State Bank, Allan G. Birch failed to provide any support for his assertion 
that the attorney fees were unreasonable and the trial court, after having made a 
determination that the fees were reasonable, reduced such fees without any explanation; 
the trial court abused its discretion in reducing the award of attorney fees. 
IX. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING BERNARD J. MYERS AN 
AWARD OF STATUTORY DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF $1,000.00. 
The trial court erred in rescinding, without explanation, the December 3, 2007 
award of statutory damages pursuant to the Second Lien Order. (R. at 679.) "The proper 
interpretation and application of a statute is a question of law which we review for 
correctness, affording no deference to the district court's legal conclusion." Gutierrez v. 
Medley, 972 P.2d 913, 914-15 (Utah 1998). 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-4(2) provides in pertinent part: 
If the person in violation of Subsection (1) refuses to release 
or correct the wrongful lien within ten days from the date of 
written request from a record interest holder of the real 
property delivered personally or mailed to the last-known 
address of the lien claimant, the person is liable to that record 
interest holder for $1,000 or for treble actual damages, 
whichever is greater, and for reasonable attorney fees and 
costs. 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-4(2) (2007). 
The plain language of the above quoted provision of the Utah Code Ann. makes 
clear that a lien claimant is liable to the record interest holder, for the greater of 
$1,000.00 or treble actual damages, to the record title holder. The language of the statute 
is mandatory and not permissive, therefore the trial court does not have discretion, after 
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finding that the recorded lien constituted a wrongful lien, to deny an award of the 
damages mandated by the plain language of the statute. 
Furthermore, in the case the trial court awarded $1,000.00 in statutory damages on 
December 3, 2007 only to subsequently deny such award on April 7, 2007. (R. at 394, 
679.) The trial court rescinded the award of statutory damages previously awarded on 
December 3, 2007 and failed to make any findings of fact or provide any explanation for 
such rescission. In any event, the language of Utah Code Ann. § 38-9^4(2) is clear and 
unambiguous in providing that if the trial court makes a determination that a recorded 
lien, after the lien claimant has received a demand to release such lien and fails to release, 
the lien claimant is liable to the record title holder for damages. Therefore the trial court 
committed clear error by deny Bernard J. Myers an award of statutory damages. 
X. BERNARD IS ENTITLED TO HIS ATTORNEYS FEES RELATED TO 
THE APPEAL OF THE WRONGFUL LIEN. 
In addition to attorney fees pursuant to Rule 33, Bernard requests that he be 
awarded his attorney fees and costs on appeal on the same basis as they were awarded at 
the trial court. "This court has interpreted attorney fee statutes broadly so as to award 
attorney fees on appeal where a statute initially authorizes them." Salmon v. Davis 
County, 916 P.2d 890, 895 (Utah 1996). "In addition, when a party who received 
attorney fees below prevails on appeal, the party is also entitled to fees reasonably 
incurred on appeal." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 319 (Utah 1998) (quotations 
and citations omitted). 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should uphold the First Lien Order, the Order 
for Sale and the Final Order in their entirety. Further, this Court should find that the trial 
court abused its discretion in reducing the award of attorney fees and reinstate the award 
entered on December 3, 2007. The Court should reinstate the December 3, 2007 award of 
statutory damages as the trial court committed clear error in interpreting Utah Code Ann 
§ 38-9-4 in a manner contrary to its plain language. 
DATED this 3rd day of December, 2008. 
/%q^^w^— 
KENT B. ALDERMAN 
DAVID R. HALL 
MATTHEW D. COOK 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 3rd day of December, 2008,1 caused to be served, via 
U.S. mail, postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT BERNARD J. MYERS to: 
EDWARD M. GARRETT 
GARRET & GARRET 
2091 East 1300 South, Suite 201 
Salt Lake City, UT 84108 
ADDENDUM OF APPELLEE 
Addendum 1: Determinative Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-4. Civil liability for filing wrongful lien—Damages. 
(1) A lien claimant who records or files or causes a wrongful lien as defined in 
Section 38-9-1 to be recorded or filed in the office of the county recorder against real 
property is liable to a record interest holder for any actual damages proximately caused 
by the wrongful lien. 
(2) If the person in violation of Subsection (1) refuses to release or correct the 
wrongful lien within ten days from the date of written request from a record interest 
holder of the real property delivered personally or mailed to the last-known address of the 
lien claimant, Ihe person is liable to that record interest holder for $1,000 or for treble 
actual damages, whichever is greater, and for reasonable attorney fees and costs. 
(3) A person is liable to the record owner of real property for $3,000 or for treble 
actual damages, whichever is greater, and for reasonable attorney fees and costs, who 
records or files or causes to be recorded or filed a wrongful lien as defined in Section 38-
9-1 in the office of the county recorder against the real property, knowing or having 
reason to know that the document: 
(a) is a wrongful lien; 
(b) is groundless; or 
(c) contains a material misstatement or false claim. 
Utah Code Ann. §75-1-201(22). Utah Uniform Probate Code Definition of 
"Incapacitated Person." 
(22) "Incapacitated person9' means any person who is impaired by reason of 
mental illness, mental deficiency, physical illness or disability, chronic use of drugs, 
chronic intoxication, or other cause, except minority, to the extent of lacking sufficient 
understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions. 
Addendum 2: Order for Sale of Home, Denying Motion to Dismiss and Denying 
Petitioner's Motion to Interpret Trust, dated March 3, 2008. 
Addendum 3: Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order Granting Bernard J. 
Myers Petition for Appointment as Personal Representative of the Eva L. Myers Estate 
and Dismissal of Complaint of Allan G. Birch, Glenn L. Birch and James Birch Against 
Bernard J. Myers, Individually and as Named Trustee of the Bernard J. Myers and Eva L. 
Myers Revocable Trust and Does 1-4, dated April 21, 2008. 
Addendum 4: Affidavit of Attorneys' Fees and Costs on Petition to Nullify 
Wrongful Lien, dated November 7, 2007. 
Addendum 5: Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order Granting Bernard J. 
Myers5 Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien, dated December 3, 2007. 
Addendum 6: Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order Granting Bernard J. 
Myers' Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien, dated April 7, 2007. 
ADDENDUM 2 
Order For Sale of Home 
KENT B. ALDERMAN (0034) 
LAURA S. SCOTT (6649) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
One Utah Center 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PROBATE DIVISION 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: 
EVA L. MYERS, 
Deceased. 
BERNARD J. MYERS, as named personal 
representative of the Estate of Eva L. Myers and 
Co-Grantor, Trustee and sole Qualified 
Beneficiary of the Bernard J. Myers and Eva L. 
Myers Revocable Living Trust, 
Petitioner, 
ALLAN G. BIRCH, 
Respondent. 
ORDER FOR SALE OF HOME, 
DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS AND 
DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION 
TO INTERPRET TRUST 
Probate No. 073901141 
Judge Robert P. Faust 
Petitioner Bernard J. Myers ("Petitioner"), as named personal representative of the Estate 
FILEB DISTBICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
/~~J^jL_ 
MAR - 3 2008 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Cferk 
4839-2459-4434,1 A°& 
of Eva L. Myers and Co-Grantor, Trustee and sole Qualified Beneficiary of the Bernard J. Myers 
and Eva L. Myers Revocable Living Trust, and Respondent Allan G. Birch came for oral 
argument before the Honorable Robert P. Faust on January 30, 2008. Petitioner was represented 
by Kent B. Alderman of Parsons Behle & Latimer. Respondent Allan G. Birch ("Respondent") 
was represented by Edward M. Garret of Garrett & Garrett. 
After full consideration of the memoranda and petitions submitted by the Petitioner and 
the Respondent, the arguments of counsel and being fully advised in the premises and other good 
cause shown, the Court hereby enters the following Order: 
1. The Motion to Dismiss filed by Allan G. Birch on November 20, 2007 is hereby 
denied without prejudice to re-filing at a later date; 
2. The Motion to Vacate Trial Date filed by Allan G. Birch on January 15, 2008 is 
hereby granted, but Petitioner Bernard J. Myers may file a motion with the Court to recover his 
fees and expenses incurred in preparation for trial; 
3. Petitioner's Motion for Interpretation of the Myers Estate Planning Documents is 
hereby denied for the time being, but may be resubmitted at a later date, if need be; 
4. The property located at 3598 Blackhawk Drive, West Valley City, Salt Lake 
County, Utah 84120 and more particularly described as follows: Lot 83, Western Acres 
Subdivision No.2, according to the official plat thereof, recorded in the office of the County 




5. The proceeds of the sale described in paragraph 4 shall be placed in an interest 
bearing account in the joint names of Gary Myers and Allan Birch and distributions from such 
account be made only pursuant to a joint stipulation of the parties or further order of the Court 
for the benefit of Bernard Myers. 
BY THE COURT: 
^A~-4^ 
Honorable Robert 
Third Judicial District 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: ' ' ° 
jOhl^yl 
Edward Garret 





KENT B. ALDERMAN (0034) 
LAURA S. SCOTT (6649) 
MATTHEW D. COOK (10751) 
Parsons Behle & Latimer 
Attorneys for Petitioner Bernard J. Myers 
One Utah Center 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111 
By. 
Third Judicial District 
APR 2 1 2008 
f SALT LAKE COUNTV 
Deputy Cl^iT 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PROBATE DIVISION 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: 
EVA L. MYERS, deceased, 
and 
ALLAN G. BIRCH, GLENN L. BIRCH 
and JAMES BIRCH, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BERNARD J. MYERS, individually and as 
named as Trustee of the Bernard J. Myers 
and Eva L. Myers Revocable Living Trust 
and Does 1-4, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER GRANTING 
BERNARD J. MYERS' PETITION FOR 
APPOINTMENT AS PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE EVA L. 
MYERS ESTATE AND DISMISSAL OF 
COMPLAINT OF ALLAN G. BIRCH, 
GLENN L. BIRCH AND JAMES BIRCH 
AGAINST BERNARD J. MYERS, 
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS NAMED 
TRUSTEE OF THE BERNARD J. 
MYERS AND EVA L. MYERS 
REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST AND 
DOES 1-4. 
Probate No. 073901141 
Civil Case No. 070913976 
Judge Robert P. Faust 
17203 001/4850-0830-8482 1 
KsRA 
The petition for Formal Probate of Will and Formal Appointment of Personal 
Representative under the Will of Eva L. Myers filed by Bernard Myers ("Bernard") and the 
Complaint of Allan G. Birch, Glenn L. Birch and James Birch (the "Birch Brothers") against 
Bernard Myers in his individual capacity and as Trustee of the Bernard J. Myers and Eva L. 
Myers Revocable Living Trust (the "Trust") came on for trial on April 1 and 2, 2008 before the 
Honorable Robert P. Faust. Bernard Myers was represented by Kent Alderman of Parsons Behle 
& Latimer and the Birch Brothers were represented by Edward Garrett of Garrett and Garrett. 
After considering the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits produced, the memorandum 
and pleadings submitted by the parties and hearing arguments of counsel the Court hereby enters 
its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. It was undisputed by the parties to these consolidated actions that the Trust was 
duly executed by Bernard and Eva Myers on November 29, 2005. 
2. There were no facts presented by the parties that there was any invalidity in the 
Trust documents or in its execution. The Trust was prepared with the aid of Bernard and Eva 
Myers' attorneys. 
3. It was undisputed by the parties that the home located at 3598 Blackhawk Drive, 
West Valley City, Salt Lake County, Utah 84120 (the "Blackhawk Property") whose legal 
description is as follows: 
Lot 83 Western Acres Subdivision Number 2 according to the 
official plat thereof recorded in the office of the County Record of 
Salt Lake County, Utah and with a tax parcel of 1532103014000 
17203.001/4850-0830-8482.1 2 
was deeded to the Trust by Warranty Deed signed by Eva L. Myers on November 25, 2005 and 
recorded December 8, 2005. 
4. There were no facts or evidence presented indicating that the Warranty Deed was 
invalid. 
5. Bernard's physician Dr. Margaret Lunt, M.D. testified that she had tested 
Bernard's mental capacity and the result of that test was that there was no evidence of mental 
impairment. In addition, her experience as his physician over the past nine years indicated that 
he had sufficient understanding and mental capacity to make and communicate responsible 
decisions including the ability to give informed consent, manage his financial affairs, and to 
engage persons to assist him with personal, medical, and legal matters. 
6. The Birch Brothers' claims of an alleged oral agreement between Bernard Myers 
and Eva Myers with respect to the disposition of the Blackhawk Property cannot be established 
due to the requirement of Utah statutes governing the creation of interests in real property be in 
writing and the Statute of Frauds. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Bernard Myers and Eva L. Myers' Revocable Living Trust is a valid and 
existing Trust under Utah law. 
2. The Blackhawk Property is owned by the Trust. 
3. Utah law provides that a 'Incapacitated person" means any person who is 
impaired by reason of mental illness, mental deficiency, physical illness or disability, chronic use 
of drugs, chronic intoxication or other cause except minority to the extent of lacking sufficient 
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understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible decisions. The Birch Brothers 
have failed to carry their burden of proof to establish that Bernard Myers is mentally 
incompetent to act as the personal representative of the Eva Myers Probate Estate and to 
continue acting as the Trustee of the Trust. Bernard Myers is not mentally impaired. 
NOW THEREFORE, the Court being fully advised in the premises and for good cause 
appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Bernard Myers is hereby appointed as personal representative of the Estate of Eva 
Myers. 
2. Bernard Myers is hereby confirmed as the sole successor Trustee of the Bernard 
Myers and Eva Myers Revocable Living Trust with all of the rights, duties and responsibilities 
inherent in that position. 
3. The Birch Brothers' Complaint against Bernard Myers in his individual and 
Trustee capacity is dismissed with prejudice. 
4. Elernard Myers' Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to the proceeds of 
the sale of the Blackhawk Property is granted and the Court's prior order with respect to payment 
of the proceeds of sale of the Blackhawk Property is hereby amended to reflect that the proceeds 
shall be paid to Bernard Myers as Trustee of the Trust to be administered pursuant to the terms of 
the Trust. 
5. The Birch Brothers' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby denied. 
6. In light of the foregoing order, the Birch Brothers' Motion to Dismiss is moot. 
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7. Upon filing of an acceptance of appointment, Letters Testamentary shall be issued 
to Bernard Myers. 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
y*4 I hereby certify that on this jVf_-(iay °f April, 2008,1 caused to be mailed, first class, 
postage prepaid, and by facsimile, a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF 
FACT CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER GRANTING BERNARD J. MYERS' 
PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE EVA L. 
MYERS ESTATE AND DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT OF ALLAN G. BIRCH, GLENN L. 
BIRCH AND JAMES BIRCH AGAINST BERNARD J. MYERS, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS 
NAMED TRUSTEE OF THE BERNARD J. MYERS AND EVA L. MYERS REVOCABLE 
LIVING TRUST AND DOES 1-4, to: 
Edward M. Garrett 
Garrett & Garrett 
2091 East 1300 South, Suite 201 
Salt Lake City, UT 84108 
-QA/+J/.K. V^i^JjLi J 
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ADDENDUM 4 
Affidavit of Attorney Fees 
KENT B. ALDERMAN (0034) 
MATTHEW D. COOK (10751) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
One Utah Center 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PROBATE DIVISION 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: 
EVA L. MYERS, 
Deceased. 
BERNARD J. MYERS, as named personal 
representative of the Estate of Eva L. Myers and 
Co-Grantor? Trustee and sole Qualified 
Beneficiary of the Bernard J. Myers and Eva L. 
Myers Revocable Living Trust, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
ALLAN G. BIRCH, 
Respondent. 
AFFIDAVIT OF ATTORNEYS' FEES 
AND COSTS ON PETITION TO 
NULLIFY WRONGFUL LIEN 
Probate No. 073901141 
Judge Robert P. Faust 
FILEB DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
NOV 0 8 2007 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
The undersigned, Matthew D. Cook of Parsons Behle & Latimer, upon his oath states as 
follows: 
1. He is a member of the Utah State Bar and is licensed to practice law in the State 
of Utah. 
2. His firm, Parsons Behle & Latimer, has been employed to represent Bernard J. 
Myers, as named personal representative of the Estate of Eva L. Myers and Co-Grantor, Trustee 
and sole Qualified Beneficiary of the Bernard J. Myers and Eva L. Myers Revocable Living 
Trust, in this matter and he is familiar with the work that has been performed in this matter. 
3. In undertaking Bernard J. Myers' Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien, Matthew D. 
Cook ($175.00 per hour), Kent B. Alderman ($290.00 per hour), Laura S. Scott ($260.00 per 



















Work on Determination of Whether or 
not Notice of Interest in Real Property 
can be treated as a wrongful lien; call 
from attorney for Caldwell Banker 
Regarding Facts on Notice of Interest. 
Conference with M. Cook regarding 
Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien. 
Research and Draft Petition to Nullify j 
Wrongful Lien and Motion for Hearing 
Thereon. Interoffice Conference with 







































1 and Revise Petition; Interoffice 
conferences with L. Scott regarding the 
same. 
[interoffice conference with M. 
Petrogeorge regarding required filings j 
with respect to petition to nullify 
wrongful lien; Interoffice conference 
with K. Alderman regarding the same; 
Review and Revise Pleadings related to 
Wrongful Lien. 
Conference with M. Cook regarding ] 
information that lien may have been 
withdrawn. 
Revise and Edit Petition for Wrongful ] 
! Lien and Motion for Hearing and 
Supporting Affidavit. 
Revise and Edit Petition for Wrongful j 
Lien; Strategize with M. Cook 
regarding the same. 
Review, research and revise motion for 1 
| hearing on wrongful lien; review and 
revise petition to nullify wrongful lien; 
review and revise supporting 
documents thereto. 
Interoffice Conference with L. Scott j 
regarding petition to nullify wrongful 
lien and related pleadings; review and 
edit petition to nullify wrongful lien in 
accordance with conference with L. 
Scott. 
Review petition to reverse lien and 1 
related affidavit; Interoffice conference 
with Bernard Myers to review Petition 
to Nullify and Affidavit and have him 
execute the same. 
Research SLC county recorders office 
regarding parcel number 15-32-103-
014; obtain copies of documents 
regarding the same. 
Conference with Jane Myers and 
Bernard Myers regarding Hearing on 
Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien | 













1 Matthew Cook 
































1 Draft Request to Submit Petition to 
Nullify wrongful Lien; Draft ! 
correspondence to Court regarding the 
scheduling of the hearing; interoffice 
conference with court clerk regarding 
scheduling; Interoffice conference with 
K. Alderman and M. Petrogeorge 
regarding the same. 
I Work on Affidavit for Bernard Myers; 1 
make arrangements to cause execution 
of the same and return of petition to 
nullify petition to remove wrongful 
1 lien. J 
Work on preparation for hearing on 1 
wrongful lien. 
Work on preparation for hearing on 
wrongful lien and interoffice 
conference with Bernard Myers in 
preparation for hearing. 
Work on preparation for hearing on 
wrongful lien. 
Work on Preparation for hearing; 
meeting with Bernard Myers and Gary 
Myers to review preparation for 
hearing and issues that may arise at the 
hearing. 
Review and Research Respondent's 
objection to Petition to Nullify 
Wrongful Lien. 
Review and Research Object objection 
to Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien; 
Draft Hearing Outline in preparation 
for hearing. 
Preparation for and attend hearing on 
petition to nullify wrongful lien. 
Research and Begin Drafting Findings 
of Facts Conclusions of Law and Order 
with Respect to Wrongful Lien. 
Draft Affidavit for Attorney's Fees, 1 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order related to Petition for 
Wrongful Lien. j 
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4. In connection with the Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien, affiant and his firm 
have performed 55.9 hours of work and affiant believes a reasonable amount for these services to 
be $11,738.00 
5. The attorneys' fees and costs incurred by Bernard J. Myers with respect to his 
Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien are reasonable given the four factors outlined by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1988) and its progeny. 
6. Specifically, with respect to the first factor of what legal work was actually 
performed, this Affidavit provides a detailed record of the legal work actually performed, 
including the number of hours spent by each attorney and a paralegal for each task performed. 
7. The second factor addresses whether the work was reasonably necessary to 
adequately prosecute the matter. In this case, Bernard J. Myers was required to file a detailed 
Petition together with an Affidavit supporting each assertion made in such Petition. Moreover, 
this matter was complicated by the fact that the Bernard J. Myers and Eva L. Myers Revocable 
Living Trust (the "Trust") was the legal owner of the real property in question and the 
Respondent was a contingent beneficiary of the Trust claiming a legal right to protect such 
interest and the lien filed in this matter was a notice of interest in real Property. 
8. With respect to the third factor under Dixie State Bank and its progeny, the hourly 
billing rates for the attorneys performing work on this matter are consistent with the hourly 
billing rates customarily charged by attorneys practicing in Salt Lake County for legal services of 
this type. 
9. Finally, with respect to the fourth factor, circumstances exist which require 
consideration of additional factors, including those listed in the Rule L5 of Professional 
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Conduct. In addition to the skill, experience and reputation of the attorneys performing services 
for Bernard J. Myers, such factors include the amount involved in this case, the results obtained, 
and the time limitations imposed by the circumstances of this case (expedited hearing on Petition 
to Nullify Wrongful Lien). 
11. Based on the above, the Court should award Bernard J. Myers, as Trustee and sole 
Qualified Beneficiary of the Bernard J. Myers and Eva L. Myers Revocable Living Trust, 
$11,738.00 in attorneys' fees. The Court should further award $1000.00 in statutory damages 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §38-9-4(2). 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this J_ day of November, 2007. 
KENT B. ALDERMAN 
MATTHEW D. COOK 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this _ | day of November, 2007, I caused to be served by 
United States mail, postage prepared, a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF 
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS ON PETITION TO NULLIFY WRONGFUL LIEN, 
to: 
Edward M. Garrett 
2091 East 1300 South #201 




First Lien Order (Awarding Full F^es) 
-;?/>-l 
KENT B. ALDERMAN (0034) 
LAURA S. SCOTT (6649) 
MATTHEW D. COOK (10751) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
One Utah Center 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
NOV 2 9 2007 
LAKE COUNTY B,_£^ 
Deputy Clerk 
ENTERED IN REGISTRY 
OF JUDGMENTS, 
\-y P? P/ DATE 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PROBATE DIVISION 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: 
EVA L. MYERS, 
Deceased. 
BERNARD J. MYERS, as named personal 
representative of the Estate of Eva L. Myers and 
Co-Grantor, Trustee and sole Qualified 
Beneficiary of the Bernard J. Myers and Eva L. 
Myers Revocable Living Trust, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
ALLAN G. BIRCH, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER GRANTING 
BERNARD J. MYERS' PETITION TO 
NULLIFY WRONGFUL LIEN 
Probate No. 073901141 
Judge Robert P. Faust 
Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law and Order Granti 
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Petitioner Bernard J. Myers' ("Petitioner"), as named personal representative of the 
Estate of Eva L. Myers and Co-Grantor, Trustee and sole Qualified Beneficiary of the Bernard J. 
Myers and Eva L. Myers Revocable Living Trust, Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien came for 
oral argument before the Honorable Robert P. Faust on October 15, 2007. Petitioner was 
represented by Kent B. Alderman of Parsons Behle & Latimer. Respondent Allan G. Birch 
("Respondent") was represented by Edward M. Garret of Garrett & Garrett. 
After considering the memoranda, petition, affidavit and exhibits submitted by the parties 
and hearing oral argument, the Court hereby enters its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Bernard J. Myers and Eva L. Myers Revocable Living Trust was the fee 
simple owner of certain real property located at 3598 Blackhawk Drive, West Valley City, Salt 
Lake County, Utah 84120 (the "Property"), more particularly described as follows: 
Lot 83, Western Acres Subdivision No.2, according to the official 
plat thereof, recorded in the office of the County Recorder of Salt 
Lake County Utah and with a Tax Parcel Number of 
15321030140000. 
2. On August 15, 2007, Respondent recorded a Notice of Interest in Real Property 
("Notice of Interest") on the Property. The Notice of Interest was recorded in Salt Lake County 
as Entry No. 10194876 in Book 9504 at Page 1656. 
3. On August 27, 2007, Petitioner gave Respondent written notice that the Notice of 
Interest was a wrongful lien and requested that Respondent remove the Notice of Interest. 
Respondent did not remove the Notice of Interest within ten (10) days of the written request. 
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4. Pursuant to the terms of the Bernard J. Myers and Eva L. Myers Revocable Living 
Trust (the "Trust") Respondent has a future interest in the Trust, which is subject to total 
divestment and does not hold a vested interest in the Property. 
5. Respondent does not have the right to possess, use, or convey the Property and 
therefore is not an owner of the Property. 
6. The Notice of Interest is not (a) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document 
signed by the owner of the Property; (b) expressly authorized by a state or federal statute; or (c) 
authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction in this 
state. 
7. The Notice of Interest was not filed in connection with an action affecting the title 
to or the right of possession of the Property. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Notice of Interest is a wrongful lien under Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1 et seq. 
because it is not (a) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner of the 
property; (b) expressly authorized by a state or federal statute; or (c) authorized by or contained 
in an order or judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction in this state. 
2. The Notice of Interest is not a valid lis pendens because it was not filed in 
connection with an action affecting the title to or the right of possession of the Property. 
3. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-4, Respondent is liable to Petitioner for 
damages and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. 
Therefore, the Court, being fully advised in the premises, and for good cause appearing, 
hereby ORDERS: 
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1. Petitioner's Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien is hereby granted in its entirety and 
judgment is hereby entered: 
(a) Declaring that the Notice of Interest is a wrongful lien on the Property and 
therefore void ab initio; and 
2. The Notice of Interest is hereby released from the property. 
3. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 38-9-4(2) Petitioner is hereby awarded statutory 
damages in the amount of $1000.00. 
4. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 38-9-4(2) Petitioner is hereby awarded his attorneys' 
fees and costs, in the amount of / / , ~7 3S as established by the Affidavit of 
Attorneys' Fees and Costs on Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien submitted to the Court. 
BY THE COURT: _ ,., ^ 
Honorable Robert B. Fatist -**$*. 
Third Judicial District^obtf "
 m/r$ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 1 
tV 
day of November, 2007, I caused to be served by 
United States mail, postage prepared, a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF 
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER GRANTING BERNARD J. MYERS 
PETITION TO NULLIFY WRONGFUL LIEN, to: 
Edward M. Garrett 
2091 East 1300 South #201 




Second Lien Order (Reducing Fees) 
*. 'wM 
KENT B. ALDERMAN (0034) 
LAURA S. SCOTT (6649) 
MATTHEW D. COOK (10751) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
One Utah Center 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Facsimile: (801) 536-6111 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
By T<Ls 
APR - 2 2008 
LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PROBATE DIVISION 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: 
EVA L. MYERS, 
Deceased. 
BERNARD J. MYERS, as named personal 
representative of the Estate of Eva L. Myers and 
Co-Grantor, Trustee and sole Qualified 
Beneficiary of the Bernard J. Myers and Eva L. 
Myers Revocable Living Trust, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
ALLAN G. BIRCH, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER GRANTING 
BERNARD J. MYERS' PETITION TO 
NULLIFY WRONGFUL LIEN 
Probate No. 073901141 
Judge Robert P. Faust 
ENTERED IN REGISTRY 
OF JUDGMENTS 
DATE 






Petitioner Bernard J. Myers' ("Petitioner"), as named personal representative of the 
Estate of Eva L. Myers and Co-Grantor, Trustee and sole Qualified Beneficiary of the Bernard J. 
Myers and Eva L. Myers Revocable Living Trust, Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien came for 
oral argument before the Honorable Robert P. Faust on October 15, 2007. Petitioner was 
represented by Kent B. Alderman of Parsons Behle & Latimer. Respondent Allan G. Birch 
("Respondent") was represented by Edward M. Garret of Garrett & Garrett. 
After considering the memoranda, petition, affidavit and exhibits submitted by the parties 
and hearing oral argument, the Court hereby enters its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Bernard J. Myers and Eva L. Myers Revocable Living Trust was the fee 
simple owner of certain real property located at 3598 Blackhawk Drive, West Valley City, Salt 
Lake County, Lftah 84120 (the "Property"), more particularly described as follows: 
Lot 83, Western Acres Subdivision No.2, according to the official 
plat thereof, recorded in the office of the County Recorder of Salt 
Lake County Utah and with a Tax Parcel Number of 
15321030140000. 
2. On August 15, 2007, Respondent recorded a Notice of Interest in Real Property 
("Notice of Interest") on the Property. The Notice of Interest was recorded in Salt Lake County 
as Entry No. 10194876 in Book 9504 at Page 1656. 
3. On August 27, 2007, Petitioner gave Respondent written notice that the Notice of 
Interest was a wrongful lien and requested that Respondent remove the Notice of Interest. 
Respondent did not remove the Notice of Interest within ten (10) days of the written request. 
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4. Pursuant to the terms of the Bernard J. Myers and Eva L. Myers Revocable Living 
Trust (the "Trust") Respondent has a future interest in the Trust, which is subject to total 
divestment and does not hold a vested interest in the Property. 
5. Respondent does not have the right to possess, use, or convey the Property and 
therefore is not an owner of the Property. 
6. The Notice of Interest is not (a) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document 
signed by the owner of the Property; (b) expressly authorized by a state or federal statute; or (c) 
authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction in this 
state. 
7. The Notice of Interest was not filed in connection with an action affecting the title 
to or the right of possession of the Property. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
L The Notice of Interest is a wrongful lien under Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1 et seq. 
because it is not (a) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the owner of the 
property; (b) expressly authorized by a state or federal statute; or (c) authorized by or contained 
in an order or judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction in this state. 
2. The Notice of Interest is not a valid lis pendens because it was not filed in 
connection with an action affecting the title to or the right of possession of the Property. 
3. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-4, Respondent is liable to Petitioner for 
damages and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. 




L Petitioner's Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien is hereby granted in its entirety and 
judgment is hereby entered: 
(a) Declaring that the Notice of Interest is a wrongful lien on the Property and 
therefore void ab initio: and 
2. The Notice of Interest is hereby released from the property. 
3. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 38-9 1(2)* Petitioner is*hereby awarded statutory 
damages,m the amount of $1000.00: 
4. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 38-9-4(2) Petitioner is hereby awarded his attorneys' 
fees and costs, in the amount of 1 tOO »QC> , as established by the Affidavit of 
Attorneys' Fees and Costs on Petition to Nullify Wrongful Lien submitted to the Court. C*A*' 
?<\&*ct,\ Uyr i^z. Cc**H. 
BY THE C 
Honorable R& 
Third Judicial 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 1 
\W 
day of November, 2007, I caused to be served by 
United States mail, postage prepared, a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF 
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER GRANTING BERNARD J. MYERS 
PETITION TO NULLIFY WRONGFUL LIEN, to: 
Edward M. Garrett 
2091 East 1300 South #201 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
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